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Research on deductive reasoning and its develop-
ment has included work on (a) conclusions reached or 
preferred by individuals who are presented with var-
ious combinations of premises (e.g., Hawkins, Pea, 
Glick, & Scribner, 1984), (b) the way these premises 
and conclusions are mentally represented (e.g., Nei-
mark & Chapman, 1975), (c) real-time mental pro-
cesses involved in reaching or evaluating these con-
clusions (e.g., Braine, 1978), and (d) the more abstract 
cognitive structures underlying these processes at vari-
ous levels of development (e.g., Moshman, 1977). 
Another line of investigation increas ingly represented 
in the literature involves the development of metalog-
ical knowledge—knowledge about the nature of logic. 
The ma jor locus of such research has been on the de-
velopment of concepts of logical necessity.
Moshman and Timmons (1982) proposed a 
three-stage model of the development of logical ne-
cessity. The model is based on a conception of de-
velopment in which each new level of understanding 
is constructed via active coordination of and meta-
cognitive refl ection on earlier concepts, such that 
knowledge implicit in an earlier structure achieves 
explicit representation (Bickhard, 1978). The child 
in stage 1 may act in accord with logical norms (e.g., 
in seriating blocks or deducing the conclusion to a 
transitive argument) but does not grasp the concept 
of logi cal necessity. The stage 2 child, by contrast, 
distinguishes conclusions that are logically neces-
sary from those that are merely empiri cally likely 
or conventionally accepted. Reasoning at this level, 
however, is always within the context of premises 
accepted as true or reasonable. The child does not fo-
cus on the abstract form of the argument as a whole. 
Thus, although stage 1 and stage 2 children can of-
ten distinguish valid arguments (in which the con-
clusion follows necessarily from the premises) from 
invalid arguments (in which this is not the case), the 
concept of a necessary, content-independent relation 
between premises and conclusion is only implicit in 
their thinking, rather than being an object of explicit 
awareness. 
 The stage 3 individual, by contrast, not only dis-
tinguishes valid from invalid arguments but can think 
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Abstract
An argument is valid if its conclusion necessarily follows from its premises, regardless of whether 
the premises and conclusion are empirically true or false. This research tested the hypothesis that 
understanding validity of inference (including its differentiation from empirical truth) is a rela-
tively late development. Students in Experiment 1 were asked to sort sets of deductive arguments. 
None of the fourth graders used validity as a basis for distinguishing arguments, while 45% of the 
seventh graders and 85% of the college students did so. Experiments 2 and 3 explored whether 
the dramatic age difference could be narrowed by (a) varying the types of arguments used, (b) ex-
plaining the concept of validity and instructing students to use it, and/or (c) providing feedback 
after each trial. Fourth-grade performance remained poor, while seventh-grade performance in-
creased to nearly the level of the college students. It was concluded that the concept of validity 
typically develops between ages 10 and 12 but that application of that competence continues to in-
crease over a much longer age span. Students not understanding validity commonly evaluated ar-
guments on the basis of empirical truth of component propositions, though even fourth graders re-
vealed an implicit awareness of logical form.
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MOSHMAN & FRANKS IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 57 (1986)154
explicitly about the form of an argument, thus differ-
entiating the neces sity of the relation between prem-
ises and con clusion from the empirical truth or falsity 
of each proposition. An individual who has at tained 
this level of metalogical understanding may be said 
to have a mature concept of infer ential validity. 
Available evidence is consistent with the fi rst 
two stages of the model in that preschool children 
can make correct deductions from a wide variety of 
premises (e.g., Braine & Ru main, 1983; Hawkins et 
al., 1984) while the (stage 2) ability to distinguish 
conclusions re quired by given premises from con-
clusions merely made plausible by those premises de-
velops during middle childhood (e.g., Berei ter, Hidi, 
& Dimitroff, 1979; Pieraut-Le Bon niec, 1980), prob-
ably beginning about age 6 (Somerville, Hadkinson, 
& Greenberg, 1979), Unfortunately, there is almost 
no research on the development of the stage 3 con-
cept of in ferential validity. Some indirect indications 
consistent with the three-stage model are pro vided by 
studies showing relatively late de velopment of con-
cepts of tautology and logi cal contradiction (Cum-
mins, 1978; Osherson & Markman, 1975) and by 
Piagetian theory, which associates hypotheticodeduc-
tive rea soning (such as deducing a conclusion from 
premises known to be false) with the emer gence of 
formal operations (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958), 
The primary purpose of the present re search 
was to look more directly at children’s and adults’ 
understanding of the concept of validity. It was hy-
pothesized that understand ing and use of this con-
cept would be a rela tively late development, rare in 
9–10-year- olds and increasingly prevalent beginning 
in early adolescence. 
Experiment 1 focused on spontaneous use of the 
concept of validity. This was studied via an adap-
tation of the “Rep Test,” a procedure developed by 
personality theorist George Kelly (1955) to assess 
the constructs or categories spontaneously applied 
by an in dividual in construing his or her experience. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Subjects.—The participants were 20 fourth grad-
ers (13 boys and seven girls), rang ing in age from 
9-0 to 10-6 (mean = 9-8); 20 seventh graders (10 
boys and 10 girls), rang ing in age from 12-0 to 14-
3 (mean = 13-0); and 41 undergraduates (31 fe-
males and 10 males), ranging in age from 18 to 37 
years (mean = 21.3). The children were all volun-
teers from public schools in Lincoln, Ne braska, and 
the undergraduates were re cruited from a course re-
quired of all education majors at the University of 
Ne braska–Lincoln. 
All fourth and seventh graders were asked at the 
conclusion of their participation whether they had 
any previous experience that seemed related to and/
or helped them with the tasks they had just done. 
None cited any formal training in logic. College stu-
dents were asked whether they had taken a course in 
logic. The few that had done so were not included 
in the experiment. No students at any age gave any 
indication during the re search (e.g., through use of 
technical ter minology) that formal training in logic 
was re sponsible for their performance. If any of the 
participants had studied any logic (e.g., syl logistic 
forms), apparently the present tasks were too differ-
ent from the content of their course work for them to 
see any connection. 
Materials: seven arguments.—Seven ar guments 
were constructed by systematically varying (a) truth 
of premises, (b) truth of con clusion, and (c) valid-
ity of argument form (see Table 1). To highlight the 
logical nature of the task, each argument was placed 
in an “If . . . then” format. Since the research was in-
tended to focus on conceptions about the na ture of 
logical arguments rather than facility with particular 
inference patterns, simple log ical forms were used 
throughout. The intent was to maximize the likeli-
hood that, if stu dents understood the idea of distin-
guishing valid from invalid arguments, they would 
eas ily be able to determine which of the present ar-
guments belonged in which category. Six of the ar-
guments involved transitive inference, which Piaget 
associates with concrete opera tions (beginning about 
age 7) and researchers in the information processing 
tradition view as understood by children as young 
as 4 (see Breslow, 1981). For the seventh (and third 
valid) argument, a simple disjunctive infer ence was 
used to insure that the three valid arguments could 
not be distinguished from the others simply on the 
basis of identical log ical form. 
Materials: test booklets.—Test booklets (for the 
college students) were constructed us ing the seven 
arguments of Table 1. Each booklet presented a se-
ries of tasks intended to provide students with multi-
ple opportunities to spontaneously distinguish argu-
ments on the basis of validity. Page 1 of each booklet 
presented general instructions and a sample exercise 
involving three geometric fi gures. Each of the next 
three pages presented three arguments and asked the 
student to “fi nd as many ways as you can that two of 
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the following are similar and the other is different” 
and to provide a written explanation for each sorting. 
One of these three pages presented arguments 1, 2, 
and 3; one presented 4, 5, and 6; and one presented 
1, 2, and 7 (see Table 1). The particular groupings of 
arguments were designed to provide several distinct 
potential sortings on each page. Thus, for example, 
arguments 1, 2, and 3 can be sorted on the basis of 
validity (1 vs. 2 and 3), truth of conclusion (1 and 2 
vs. 3), or content (1 and 3 vs. 2). Order of the three 
pages was systematically varied across test booklets. 
Page 5 was identical with pages 2, 3, and 4, ex-
cept that all seven arguments were presented and 
the instructions specifi ed that each sorting should 
divide the seven arguments into two groups (again 
along any dimension that the student could think of 
and again with an explanation of the basis for each 
sorting). Finally, page 6 presented the same seven ar-
guments with instructions to order them from “most 
logical” to “least logical” (with ties allowed) and to 
explain this ranking.
Procedure.—College students were tested in 
groups of about eight or 10. The experimenter 
handed out the test booklets, carefully went through 
the instructions and sample exercise, solicited ques-
tions, and remained present in case of diffi culties.
The same arguments and the same sequence 
of tasks were used for the younger students. There 
were, however, some major procedural differences 
designed to avoid false negatives by making it as 
easy as possible for children to demonstrate any in-
clination to think about arguments in terms of their 
validity.
Table 1
Seven Arguments in Experiment 1
Premises:       Both True       At Least One False 
Form of argument:  Valid  Invalid  Valid  Invalid 
Conclusion:
True 1  2  4  5 
False  * 3  7 6 
1. If elephants are bigger than dogs 
And dogs are bigger than mice 
Then elephants are bigger than mice 
2. If adults are older than babies 
And children are older than babies 
Then adults are older than children 
3. If dogs are bigger than mice 
And elephants are bigger than mice 
Then dogs are bigger than elephants 
4. If dogs are bigger than elephants 
And elephants are bigger than mice 
Then dogs are bigger than mice 
5. If babies are older than adults 
And babies are older than children 
Then adults are older than children 
6. If mice are bigger than dogs 
And mice are bigger than elephants 
Then dogs are bigger than elephants 
 7. If elephants are either animals or plants 
And elephants arc not animals 
Then elephants are plants 
* No such argument is possible since a valid argument with true premises cannot have a false conclusion. 
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First, the arguments appeared on index cards that 
could be sorted and ranked physi cally. Second, stu-
dents were individually in terviewed by the fi rst au-
thor and their re sponses were tape-recorded so that it 
was unnecessary for them to deal with a test book let 
or express themselves in writing. Third, each fourth 
grader was asked to read the fi rst few cards aloud to 
ascertain that reading was not a source of diffi culty 
(it was not). Fourth, in sorting the set of all seven 
arguments, chil dren were permitted, if they wished, 
to use more than two categories in a single sorting. 
Fifth, the interview procedure allowed for fol low-up 
questions by the interviewer to ascer tain whether va-
lidity might be involved in what initially appeared 
to be an insuffi cient explanation. Finally, on each 
set of three arguments, if a given child did not spon-
taneously produce all three possible ways of divid-
ing them, the experimenter would demonstrate each 
missing division of the cards, including the valid 
versus invalid division, and ask whether that divi-
sion made any sense and, if it did, why.
Scoring.—Students’ sortings of each set of ar-
guments were classifi ed on the basis of which cards 
they placed together and their explanations. In the 
case of fourth and seventh graders, full credit for un-
derstanding validity (or any other basis for sorting) 
was given for post hoc explanation of sortings sug-
gested by the interviewer. Seven mutually ex clusive 
categories were used: 
1. Validity.—Student separates valid from invalid 
argument(s), indicating that in the case of the valid 
argument(s) the conclusion must be true provided 
the premises were true (because of the form of the 
argument), while for invalid argument(s) one could 
not tell from the premises whether or not the con-
clusion were true (though one might be certain of its 
truth or falsity on the basis of other empirical knowl-
edge). Formal explication of the distinction between 
validity and truth is not required, but the explanation 
must be suffi cient to rule out sortings based on form, 
truth, content, or partial matching (see below). 
2. Form.—Student notes similarity and/or differ-
ence in abstract form of argument but does not in-
dicate that one form is superior to another in terms 
of the logicality of the connection between premises 
and conclusion. 
3. Truth.—Student distinguishes arguments on 
the basis of whether the premises and/or conclusions 
are empirically true or false. 
4. Content.—Student differentiates arguments on 
the basis of the content of the terms (e.g., animals vs. 
people) and/or relations (e.g., size vs. age). 
5. Partial matching.—Arguments are matched 
on the basis of having the same or comparable words 
in a particular location (e.g., two arguments both use 
the word “dog” as the fi rst term in the conclusion). 
6. Mixed.—Student sorts the set of seven argu-
ments into three or more categories based on an id-
iosyncratic combination of factors (e.g., true conclu-
sions vs. animal content vs. human content). 
7. Miscellaneous.—Explanation missing, not fi t-
ting above categories, insuffi cient to classify, or not 
in accord with student’s own grouping of cards. 
Reliability was assessed by having a sec-
ond coder classify 50 randomly chosen written re-
sponses. Agreement with the original rater was 82% 
(with 98% agreement on the critical question of 
whether or not each sorting refl ected an understand-
ing of validity). 
The major analysis of each student’s ranking 
of the seven arguments consisted of determining 
whether she or he placed the three valid arguments 
(1, 4, and 7) as the three most logical (regardless 
of whether those were perceived as tied with each 
other or were placed in some order). Because there 
seemed to be no systematic basis for such rankings 
other than validity and since the probability of such 
a ranking being produced by chance is less than 3%, 
no explanation was required (though adequate valid-
ity explanations were usually provided). 
Results 
Validity.—Not a single fourth grader ever used 
the concept of validity in sorting or ranking the 
cards. Of the seventh graders, 35% sorted one or 
more of the trios on the basis of validity (with ex-
planation), 20% sorted the set of all seven this way 
(with explanation), and 35% chose the three valid 
arguments as “most logical” in ranking the set of 
seven. Corresponding fi gures for college students 
were 78%, 46%, and 61%. Overall, the percentages 
of fourth graders, seventh graders, and college stu-
dents respectively using the concept of validity at 
some point in the research (i.e., in at least one of the 
four sortings—with explanation—or in the ranking) 
were 0%, 45%, and 85%, χ2(2, N = 81) = 40.4, p < 
.001. Fourth-grade performance was signifi cantly 
below that of seventh graders (binomial p < .01), 
which in turn was signifi cantly below that of college 
students, χ2(1, N = 61) = 10.9, p < .001. Performance 
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of males and females did not differ signifi cantly at 
any age. As individuals, the seventh graders spanned 
the entire range of possible performance, with many 
showing behavior indistinguishable from that of the 
fourth graders and others providing sortings, rank-
ings, and explanations indistinguishable from those 
of the most sophisticated college students. 
Other concepts used.—Table 2 shows the per-
centage of students at each grade using each of var-
ious bases for sorting. A series of χ2 tests showed 
no age differences in sortings on the basis of con-
tent, truth, or partial matching (p > .10 in each case). 
There were signifi cant age differences in (a) sort-
ings on the basis of validity, for trios, χ2(2, N = 81) = 
34.6, p < .001; for set of seven, χ2(2 , N = 81) = 15.1, 
p < .001; (b) sortings on the basis of form, for trios, 
χ2(2, N = 81) = 19.6, p < .001; for set of  seven, χ2(2, 
N = 81) = 13.6, p < .01; and (c) miscellaneous sort-
ings, for trios, χ2(2, N = 81) = 13.2, p < .01; for set of 
seven, χ2(2,N = 81) = 19.4, p < .001. 
Students in all three grades were remarkably 
similar in the nearly universal use of content as a ba-
sis for distinguishing arguments, the very common 
use of empirical truth, and the occasional use of par-
tial matching. The major age difference is that sort-
ings on the basis of form and validity were much less 
common in the seventh graders than in the college 
students and were entirely absent in the fourth grad-
ers. The relative absence of miscellaneous responses 
in the children confi rms the success of the interview 
procedure in making it possible to assign vague or 
incomplete initial explanations to nonmiscellaneous 
categories on the basis of further questioning. 
Turning to the ranking data, the percentages of 
students selecting the three valid arguments as the 
three most logical for grades four, seven, and col-
lege respectively were, as noted earlier, 0%, 35%, 
and 61%, χ2(2,N = 81) = 21.1, p < .001. Most of 
the students who did not select the three valid argu-
ments as most logical instead selected the two argu-
ments (1 and 2) in which each of the three compo-
nent propositions was empirically true. This pattern 
accounted for the fi nal ranking of 55% of the fourth 
graders, 62% of those seventh graders who did not 
use a validity ranking, and 63% of those college stu-
dents who did not use a validity ranking. Similarly, 
students not using validity commonly chose as least 
logical either the three arguments (5, 6, and 7) con-
taining two or more false propositions (25%, 46%, 
and 31% for grades 4, 7, and college, respectively) 
or the three arguments (3, 6, and 7) with false con-
clusions (20%, 23%, and 6% for the three groups, 
respectively). In explaining their rankings, stu-
dents not ranking by validity typically gave empiri-
cal truth (or some combination of validity and truth) 
as their primary rationale (80%, 85%, and 87% for 
the three groups, respectively). Overall, the results 
of the rankings suggest a developmental trend from 
(a) a very strong tendency among fourth graders to 
interpret “most logical” as meaning most empir-
ically true to (b) a modal tendency among college 
students to interpret the same expression, at least in 
the context of the present set of tasks, as meaning 
most valid. 
Remaining questions.—The results so far show 
important changes beyond age 10 in how people 
think about arguments. Fourth graders failed to dis-
Table 2
Percentage of Students Using Various Bases for Sorting Arguments in Experiment 1
                                               Grade 4                                      Grade 7                                       College 
Basis for sorting    Triosa  Alltb   Triosa  Alltb  Triosa  Alltb
Validity  0  0  35  20  78  46 
Form  0  0  15  5  51  34 
Truth  60  45  70  30  66  34 
Content  100  85  90  95  95  85 
Partial matching  30  15  35  25  17  15 
Miscellaneous  10  0  10  0  46  39 
Mixedc   –  25  –   40   –    – 
a Percent using the indicated concept or strategy in sorting at least one of the three sets of three arguments. 
b Percent using the indicated concept or strategy in sorting the set of all seven arguments. 
c Mixed sortings were possible only for fourth and seventh graders sorting the set of all seven arguments. 
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tinguish arguments on the basis of validity despite a 
number of opportunities to do so. Their failure can-
not be explained in terms of limited ability to ver-
balize their understanding since the age trend on the 
ranking task (where no verbalization was required) 
paralleled that on the sorting task. These data are 
consistent with what we may call the competence 
defi cit hypothesis: fourth graders do not understand 
the concept of validity. 
There are, however, at least two other plausi-
ble explanations. One possibility is that the results 
refl ect not a competence defi cit but rather a general 
performance defi cit: fourth graders may understand 
the concept of validity but do not spontaneously ap-
ply it in distinguishing and evaluating arguments. A 
third possibility is that the fourth graders have a spe-
cifi c performance defi cit: they understand the con-
cept of validity but have trouble applying it to par-
ticular forms of argument such as the transitive 
arguments that were predominant in Experiment 1. 
The main purpose of Experiment 2 was to de-
cide among these three alternatives with respect to 
the fourth graders. A secondary purpose was to con-
sider these same three possibilities with respect to 
the difference in performance between the seventh 
graders and the college students. The possibility of a 
specifi c performance defi cit was explored by (a) pre-
senting fi ve types of argument, all known to be sim-
ple for young children, and (b) including a separate 
“control” task designed to assess facility with each 
argument type without requiring students to think 
about the validity of the argument as a whole. The 
possibility of a general performance defi cit was in-
vestigated by defi ning validity, discussing exam-
ples of valid and invalid arguments, and specifi cally 
asking students to use this concept in evaluating the 
arguments on the main task. The intent was not to 
teach the concept of validity but to elicit it if it was 
already within the student’s competence. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Subjects.—The participants, all new volunteers, 
were 18 fourth graders (13 boys and fi ve girls), rang-
ing in age from 9-1 to 11-4 (mean = 9-9); 18 seventh 
graders (13 boys and fi ve girls), ranging in age from 
12-7 to 13-11 (mean = 13-0); and 20 college under-
graduates (fi ve males and 15 females), ranging in 
age from 19 to 23 (mean = 20.9), none of whom had 
taken a logic course. Children were recruited from 
Lincoln public schools and the college students from 
a class required of all education majors at the Uni-
versity of Nebraska–Lincoln. 
Materials.—Each participant completed a six-
page test booklet and a two-page control task. The 
fi rst page of the booklet defi ned what it means for an 
argument to be (a) valid (“the last line follows from 
the earlier information. In other words, the last line 
would have to be true if the earlier information were 
true”) and (b) invalid (“the last line does not fol-
low from the earlier information. In other words, the 
last line could be false even if the earlier informa-
tion were all true”). It then provided simple exam-
ples of (a) a valid argument with true premises and 
conclusion, (b) a valid argument with false prem-
ises and conclusion, (c) an invalid argument with 
true premises and conclusion, and (d) an invalid ar-
gument with false premises and conclusion. In each 
case the explanation indicated whether the argument 
was valid, explained why, and highlighted the dif-
ference between validity and truth. The remaining 
pages of the booklet presented 40 arguments, with 
instructions to label each as valid or invalid. 
Five forms of valid argument were selected: 
Transitivity (e.g., “Abe is taller than Bob; Bob 
is taller than Chuck; therefore, Abe is taller than 
Chuck”); Class instantiation, corresponding to 
Braine and Rumain’s (1983) PL12 (e.g., “All horses 
are fi sh; Blacky is a horse; therefore, Blacky is a 
fi sh”); Disjunction, corresponding to Braine and Ru-
main’s N8 (e.g., “Either bears fl y or birds fl y; bears 
do not fl y; therefore, birds fl y”); Conjunction, cor-
responding to Braine and Rumain’s N1 (e.g., “Cars 
have motors; trucks have motors; therefore, cars 
and trucks have motors”); and Reverse conjunc-
tion, corresponding to Braine and Rumain’s N2 (e.g., 
“Nickels and dimes are plants; therefore, dimes are 
plants”). The transitivity form had been used in Ex-
periment 1 on the basis of evidence of its simplicity. 
The other four forms are all among those proposed 
by Braine and Rumain (1983) as fundamental infer-
ence schemas of natural logic. Evidence summarized 
by Braine and Rumain suggests that all are well un-
derstood by age 5 or 6. 
For each of the fi ve argument forms, an analo-
gous but invalid form was constructed (e.g., for con-
junction, “Cars have motors; trucks have motors; 
therefore, trucks and buses have motors”), thus yield-
ing 10 argument forms (one valid and one invalid for 
each type of argument). Next, two variants of each 
of the 10 forms were constructed in such a way as 
to maintain the validity or invalidity of the form (i.e., 
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by reversing the order of the premises or the order of 
two conjoined or disjoined terms), thus yielding 20 
argument forms (two valid and two invalid for each 
type of argument). Three arguments were then con-
structed for each of the 20 forms by fi lling in true 
content (e.g., “Cars have motors,” as in the exam-
ple above), false content (e.g., “Cars have wings”), or 
neutral content (e.g., “Blorks have tails”), thus yield-
ing 60 arguments. Because that seemed an excessive 
number, 40 were systematically selected such that (a) 
half of the arguments in each content category (true, 
false, neutral) were valid and half invalid, and (b) true 
and false content were equally represented in both the 
valid and invalid variants of each of the fi ve types of 
argument. A single random order of the 40 arguments 
was used for half of the test booklets at each age and 
the reverse of that order for the other half. 
The control task included ten written arguments 
with neutral content, one for each of the ten valid 
argument forms included in the test booklet. For 
each of the ten arguments, the student was asked to 
choose the better of two conclusions (e.g., “Stan is 
older than Bob; David is older than Stan; (A) There-
fore, David is older than Bob; (B) Therefore, Bob is 
older than David”). In each case, one conclusion fol-
lowed necessarily from the premises and the other 
was inconsistent with them. 
Procedure.—Students were tested in groups of 
no more than four so that the experimenter could 
monitor their attention to the defi nitions and exam-
ples and their understanding of the instructions. The 
fi rst author  presented each student with a test book-
let. He then read the defi nitions, examples, and in-
structions aloud while students read along. After 
soliciting questions, he remained present while stu-
dents worked on the test booklets. None had any dif-
fi culty following the directions. After completing the 
test booklet, each student then completed the control 
task. The entire session typically took 20–30 min. 
Results 
Performance was analyzed with respect to each 
of two criteria—one fairly stringent and one quite 
lax. The stringent criterion for success was correct 
evaluation of at least 90% of the 40 arguments as 
valid or invalid. The percentages of students meet-
ing this criterion for grades four, seven, and college, 
respectively, were 11%, 67%, and 80%, χ2(2, N = 
56) = 19.9, p < .001. The proportion of males and 
females meeting the criterion did not differ signifi -
cantly at any age. 
The lax criterion was correct evaluation of at 
least 70% of the arguments, representing a perfor-
mance which, though quite inconsistent, was signif-
icantly (p < .01, one-tailed) above chance level. The 
percentages of students meeting this criterion for 
grades four, seven, and college, respectively, were 
56%, 89%, and 100%. Most of the fourth graders 
thus met the lax criterion, though their performance 
as a group remained signifi cantly inferior to that of 
the seventh graders, χ2(1,N = 36) = 4.98, p < .05, 
and college students (binomial p < .01). Again, there 
were no sex differences. 
Specifi c performance defi cit.—One possible 
explanation for the observed age differences is that 
younger children have trouble understanding some 
of the specifi c arguments used. It is certainly plau-
sible that an individual might understand the distinc-
tion between valid and invalid arguments but be un-
able to determine, in the case of a particular type of 
argument, which variants fi t in which category. 
To explore this possibility, the present study in-
cluded a control task involving the same fi ve types 
of argument as the validity task but merely requir-
ing subjects to select the best conclusion for a given 
set of premises rather than to evaluate arguments as 
valid or invalid. Performance on the control task was 
excellent at each age. No subject scored less than 
eight out of 10. Mean scores out of 10 (and % scor-
ing 10 out of 10) for grades four, seven, and college, 
respectively, were 9.6 (67%), 9.7 (78%), and 10.0 
(100%). These results provide no support for the hy-
pothesis that the younger subjects were simply con-
fused by the types of argument used. 
Further analysis showed that the overall age 
trend on the main task held for each of the fi ve types 
of argument (see Table 3). Differences among argu-
ment types in frequency of consistently correct per-
formance for the fourth graders were not signifi cant 
(binomial p > .10 for each pair). Again, the specifi c 
performance defi cit hypothesis is not supported. 
General performance defi cit versus compe-
tence defi cit.—Although there appear to be strong 
grounds for ruling out the specifi c performance def-
icit hypothesis, it is not so easy to choose between 
the other two alternatives: general performance def-
icit versus competence defi cit. The crux of the mat-
ter is the basis for the partial success of the substan-
tial number of fourth graders who met the lax (70%) 
criterion for success on the present task but not the 
more stringent (90%) criterion. One possibility is 
that these children understand the concept of validity 
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but were somehow unable to apply it with reasonable 
consistency. The other possibility is that the marginal 
fourth graders have heuristics for correctly classify-
ing many arguments but that their inconsistency re-
veals their lack of a genuine grasp of validity. 
Further analysis aimed at addressing more di-
rectly just how children were reasoning about the ar-
guments presented. The 40 arguments in the test 
booklet included (a) 16 arguments with neutral con-
tent, (6) 12 arguments in which truth and validity cor-
responded (six valid arguments with true content and 
six invalid arguments with false content), and (c) 12 
arguments in which truth and validity confl icted (six 
valid arguments with false content and six invalid ar-
guments with true content). This fi nal set of 12 may 
be considered the core arguments on the test since, by 
defi nition, a genuine grasp of the concept of validity 
involves recognition of the distinction between valid-
ity and empirical truth. Moreover, the results of Ex-
periment 1 suggest that fourth graders understand the 
concept of empirical truth and use it as a basis for dis-
tinguishing arguments and evaluating their logicality. 
How can total score on these 12 critical ar-
guments be interpreted? A student who was con-
sistently responding on the basis of validity would 
obviously obtain a score of 12. A student who was 
consistently evaluating items with true content as 
valid and those with false content as invalid (despite 
explicit instructions to the contrary) would miss ev-
ery one of these items and thus score 0. Finally, a 
student responding randomly would be expected to 
obtain a score of about 6. A binomial test showed 
that scores of 0, 1, 11, and 12 deviate signifi cantly 
(p < .01) from chance performance. Accordingly, all 
students were divided into three categories: (a) score 
of 0 or 1(indicating evaluation on basis of empirical 
truth), (b) score between 2 and 10 (not signifi cantly 
different from chance), and (c) score of 11 or 12 (in-
dicating evaluation on the basis of validity). 
The percentages of students responding on the 
basis of validity at a level signifi cantly above chance 
for grades 4, 7, and college, respectively, were 11%, 
61%, and 75%, χ2(2, N = 56) = 16.8, p <.001. Sev-
enth-grade performance was signifi cantly better 
than that of the fourth graders, χ2(1, N = 36) = 9.75, 
p < .01, but did not differ signifi cantly from that of 
the college students, χ2(l, N = 38) = 0.85, p > .10. 
Thus, on these critical items, very few fourth grad-
ers showed a grasp of validity and there was a sharp 
increase with age. The results, however, do not sup-
port the view that those students not responding on 
the basis of validity were systematically respond-
ing on the basis of truth. Only three students—two 
fourth graders and a seventh grader—selected the 
arguments with true content as valid at a level sig-
nifi cantly greater than chance. What then were the 
remaining students, including 78% of the fourth 
graders, doing? 
Although the performance of these remaining 
students did not differ signifi cantly from chance, 
it seems unlikely that they were actually respond-
ing randomly. As we have already seen, most of 
the fourth graders and nearly all of the older stu-
dents scored signifi cantly above chance level on the 
test as a whole. A more plausible alternative is sug-
gested by the excellent performance of all the stu-
dents on the “control” task. Although the control 
task was purposely designed so as not to require 
students to think about the validity of entire argu-
ments, it is diffi cult to see how one could consis-
tently select proper deductive conclusions for the 
10 sets of premises on this task without at least an 
implicit grasp of logical form. It is likely that even 
the fourth graders were also responding to the main 
task on the basis of logical form but that, because 
they do not really understand validity, they tended 
to incorporate elements of truth and falsity in mak-
ing their judgments. 
Table 3
Percentage of Students at Each Grade Showing Perfect Performance (8/8) on Each Type of Argument 
in Experiment 2
Type of Argument  Grade 4  Grade 7  College 
Transitivity   17  50  85 
Class instantiation    6  44  50 
Conjunction    28  72  70 
Reverse conjunction    28  67  90 
Disjunction   22  61  85
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One source of support for the view that stu-
dents have an implicit understanding of form prior 
to understanding inferential validity is performance 
on the 16 arguments with neutral content, in which 
empirical truth is not an issue. A score of 14 or bet-
ter on these arguments is signifi cantly above chance 
level (binomial p < .01, one-tailed). This criterion 
was met by 39% of the fourth graders, 78% of the 
seventh graders, and 90% of the college students, 
χ2(2,N  = 56) = 12.5, p < .01. Moreover, 94% of the 
fourth graders (as well as 94% of the seventh grad-
ers and 100% of the college students) scored above 
the chance score of 8, even if not signifi cantly so. It 
is diffi cult to account for the fact that nearly all the 
fourth graders scored above chance on the neutral ar-
guments, and many signifi cantly so, without postu-
lating some awareness of argument form. 
If it is true, however, that younger children also 
take truth into account when this is possible, then 
they should be less likely to respond correctly to ar-
guments where validity confl icts with truth than to 
arguments where they correspond. To test this, each 
student’s score on the 12 critical items where truth 
and validity confl icted was compared with his or her 
score on the 12 items where they corresponded. Of 
the 18 fourth graders, 10 scored higher on arguments 
where truth and validity corresponded than on argu-
ments where they confl icted and only one showed 
the reverse pattern (binomial p < .01, one-tailed). 
For eight of the 10, the difference was fairly sub-
stantial (3 or more points). Overall, whereas 33% of 
the fourth graders scored signifi cantly above chance 
level in distinguishing valid from invalid arguments 
when validity corresponded to truth, only 11% did so 
when truth and validity confl icted. 
Of the 18 seventh graders, only six scored 
higher on arguments where truth and validity corre-
sponded than on arguments where they confl icted, 
and seven showed the reverse pattern (binomial p > 
.10). Only four of the 13 differences were substan-
tial (3 or more points). Similarly, only three college 
students scored higher on arguments where truth 
and validity corresponded, and seven showed the re-
verse pattern (binomial p > .10). None of these dif-
ferences exceeded 2 points. Thus, differences in per-
formance on the two categories of arguments tended 
to be small for the older students and did not favor 
one category over the other, whereas for the fourth 
graders the differences were more often substantial 
and strongly tended to favor arguments where valid-
ity corresponded to truth. Despite explicit instruc-
tions to evaluate arguments on the basis of validity 
and to ignore truth, fourth graders were less likely to 
evaluate an argument as valid if its content was false 
than if its content was true. 
Although these data support the earlier conclu-
sion that empirical truth played an important role in 
the reasoning of many fourth graders, they also sup-
port the conclusion that it was rarely, if ever, the sole 
consideration. Thus these analyses further support 
the view that subjects not reasoning on the basis of 
an explicit understanding of validity do consider the 
form of arguments but are often inconsistent about 
this and, in particular, commonly incorporate consid-
erations of empirical truth. This is what one would 
expect from an individual whose understanding of 
logical form is only implicit in the unconscious op-
eration of basic inference schemata (Braine, 1978) 
rather than an object of explicit awareness. 
On the whole, the results tend to support the 
competence defi cit hypothesis with respect to the 
fourth graders. Even after careful defi nition of va-
lidity, detailed examples, and explicit instructions 
to use this concept in evaluating arguments, only 
two fourth graders were fairly consistent in distin-
guishing valid from invalid arguments for the en-
tire set of 40 and only two (the same two students) 
showed a signifi cant tendency to distinguish validity 
from truth on the critical set of 12. The difference in 
Experiment 1 between seventh graders and college 
students, by contrast, appears to have been due to a 
general performance defi cit in that seventh graders 
performed at the level of college students under the 
favorable conditions of Experiment 2. Seventh grad-
ers are less likely than college students to spontane-
ously use the concept of validity (a performance def-
icit revealed in Experiment l), but most do grasp that 
concept (a competence revealed in Experiment 2). 
Most 9–10-year-olds apparently do not grasp 
the concept of inferential validity, and a genuine 
grasp of this concept and its distinction from empir-
ical truth develops rapidly beyond that age. It might 
still be argued, however, that many of the fourth 
graders really do grasp the concept of validity but 
were not suffi ciently consistent in applying it for 
their competence to become apparent in the present 
experiment. The aim of Experiment 3 was to decide 
between these possibilities by giving students feed-
back after each judgment of validity. If the compe-
tence defi cit explanation is correct, the fourth grad-
ers are really responding on a variety of bases other 
than validity and would fi nd it diffi cult to profi t sys-
tematically from the feedback. If, instead, they do 
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grasp validity and are simply inconsistent in apply-
ing it, then regular feedback should improve the con-




Subjects.—The participants, all new volunteers, 
were 20 fourth graders (three boys and 17 girls), 
ranging in age from 9-0 to 10-5 (mean = 9-7); 20 
seventh graders (12 boys and eight girls), ranging in 
age from 12-5 to 13-5 (mean = 13-0); and 20 college 
undergraduates (six males and 14 females), ranging 
in age from 19 to 43 (mean = 22.0), none of whom 
had taken a logic course. Once again, the children 
were recruited from Lincoln public schools and the 
college students from a course required of all educa-
tion majors at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. 
Materials.—Each of the 40 arguments from Ex-
periment 2 was typed on a separate index card. A 
single random order of the cards was used for half of 
the subjects in each age × explanation group (see be-
low) and the reverse of that order for the other half. 
Procedure.—Each student was assessed indi-
vidually by the second author. Half of the students at 
each age were randomly assigned to the explanation 
condition. The experimenter fi rst explained the con-
cept of validity to them, using the defi nitions and ex-
amples from Experiment 2, and solicited questions. 
She then presented the index cards one at a time and 
asked them to sort each argument into one of two 
piles—valid versus invalid. After each argument, the 
experimenter indicated whether the student’s choice 
was correct or incorrect and allowed the student, if 
necessary, to move the card to the correct pile. Stu-
dents were permitted at any time to look back at 
cards already sorted for guidance. 
The other half of the students at each age per-
formed the same task but without an initial explana-
tion of validity. They were simply told that a rule ex-
isted for sorting the cards and that their task was to 
use the feedback from the experimenter to discover 
the rule. 
Scoring.—Students were credited with under-
standing validity if they correctly placed 90% of the 
40 arguments or 90% of the last 20 or 90% of the 
last 10. 
Results 
Age differences were substantial: The criterion 
of success was met by only 10% of the fourth grad-
ers but by 75% of the seventh graders and 90% of 
the college students, χ2(2, N = 60) = 30.6, p < .001. 
As in Experiment 2, seventh-grade performance sig-
nifi cantly exceeded that of the fourth graders, χ2(1, 
N = 40) = 17.3, p < .001, but did not differ signifi -
cantly from that of the college students (binomial p 
> .10). Differences between the explanation and no-
explanation groups were not signifi cant. Most sev-
enth graders and college students achieved criterion 
regardless of whether they received prior explana-
tion of validity, while few fourth graders (one out 
of 10 in each condition) did so. The mean numbers 
of correct choices for the explanation and no expla-
nation groups, respectively, were 27.9 and 23.8 for 
grade 4, 34.9 and 30.1 for grade 7, and 37.9 and 36.1 
for college students. Once again, there were no sex 
differences. 
These results provide further support for a com-
petence defi cit explanation with respect to fourth 
graders and a general performance defi cit explana-
tion with respect to seventh graders. Even with reg-
ular feedback, most fourth graders were unable to 
achieve reasonable consistency in sorting simple 
arguments on the basis of validity. Seventh grad-
ers, in contrast, were able to use the feedback to at-
tain a level of performance comparable to that of 
college students, thus revealing their underlying 
competence. 
General Discussion 
Over the course of three studies of the con-
cept of validity, we have varied (a) the nature of the 
task (free sorting of several arguments, explanation 
of sortings provided by experimenter, ranking from 
most to least logical, evaluation of single arguments 
as valid or invalid); (b) the forms of argument (tran-
sitive, disjunctive, etc.); (c) whether subjects were in-
terviewed individually or tested in groups using test 
booklets; (d) whether or not subjects were provided 
with an initial explanation of validity; (e) whether 
or not they were provided with regular feedback on 
their responses; and (f) whether or not they were re-
quired to explain the basis for their responses. 
The consistent diffi culty of the fourth grad-
ers across this wide range of tasks, arguments, test-
ing conditions, and criteria has led us to conclude 
that they do not understand the concept of valid-
ity (a competence defi cit) rather than that they were 
failing to apply it in particular circumstances (a per-
formance defi cit). The hypothesis that fourth grad-
ers merely have trouble with particular types of ar-
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gument (e.g., the transitive arguments of Experiment 
1) was rejected on the basis of poor performance 
in Experiments 2 and 3 on a wide variety of argu-
ments that were purposely selected (and indepen-
dently shown) to be very simple. The possibility that 
fourth graders do not spontaneously think about ar-
guments in terms of validity but can do so if asked 
to was ruled out on the basis of their failure to profi t 
from the explicit directions of Experiment 2. The 
possibility that they are merely inconsistent and need 
systematic feedback to keep them on track is coun-
tered by their inability to profi t from such feedback 
in Experiment 3. Finally, the possibility that they do 
think in terms of validity but simply fail to provide 
adequate verbal explanation of their understanding is 
ruled out by the fact that no verbal explanation was 
required in Experiments 2 or 3 or in the ranking task 
of Experiment 1. 
Nevertheless, no claim of lack of competence 
can ever be conclusively proved. It remains possi-
ble that some new task and/or conditions can be de-
vised that will reveal a grasp of validity in children 
younger than the present results indicate. A key issue 
in attempting to devise such a task is ascertaining 
that, although it removes any inappropriate sources 
of diffi culty, it still constitutes a genuine test of the 
concept of validity. 
It might be noted, for example, that all of the 
present experiments involved arguments varying 
not only in validity but also in argument type, con-
tent, and/or truth status of premises and conclu-
sions. It could reasonably be hypothesized that, after 
brief guidance, fourth graders might fare quite well 
in distinguishing valid from invalid variants of ar-
guments if all the arguments were of the same gen-
eral type (e.g., conjunctive), similar in content (e.g., 
animals), and neutral in truth value. But it is ques-
tionable whether such evidence would demonstrate 
a genuine grasp of validity. As we have used that 
term, understanding the concept of validity by defi -
nition includes differentiating it from empirical truth 
and generalizing across some range of content areas 
and argument types. Further research aimed at dem-
onstrating greater competence at earlier ages should 
involve tasks that, though simplifi ed, still require a 
suffi ciently differentiated and generalizable concept 
of validity to support the claim that what is being 
assessed really is validity and not a more primitive 
heuristic. 
Although it remains possible that fourth grad-
ers understand validity, the current evidence strongly 
suggests that they do not. A useful direction for fu-
ture research would be to further explore what they 
do understand about the nature of logic. 
We have seen that the fourth graders did not 
spontaneously evaluate arguments on the basis of 
their validity, a fi nding consistent with previous ev-
idence that children of this age do not think about 
logical form independent of empirical truth (Cum-
mins, 1978; Osherson & Markman, 1975). Even 
after (a) careful defi nition, examples and instruc-
tions and/or (b) systematic trial-by-trial feedback, 
very few consistently distinguished valid from in-
valid variants of even the simplest arguments. The 
fourth graders did, however, show an impressive 
ability to select the correct conclusions for sets of 
premises refl ecting these same types of arguments, 
a fi nding consistent with extensive evidence on de-
ductive reasoning in young children (Braine & Ru-
main, 1983; Hawkins et al., 1984). Moreover, most 
scored signifi cantly above chance level in distin-
guishing valid from invalid arguments in Experi-
ment 2. 
We can account for the above pattern of fi nd-
ings by postulating (in accord with Moshman & 
Timmons, 1982) that 9–10-year-olds do not explic-
itly think about logical form but are nonetheless im-
plicitly aware of it. They can use their basic infer-
ence schemata (including an implicit awareness of 
form) to reach or recognize logically necessary con-
clusions and can associate this with the idea of va-
lidity. However, because they do not think explicitly 
about form, they do not make the abstract differenti-
ation between validity of form and truth of content. 
For this reason, they do not spontaneously sort argu-
ments on the basis of form or validity (Experiment 
l), they incorporate consideration of empirical truth 
in judging the validity of arguments even after in-
structions and counterexamples (Experiment 2), and 
they fail to profi t from systematic feedback (Exper-
iment 3). Many seventh graders, by contrast, spon-
taneously distinguished arguments on the basis of 
form and validity, though evaluations based on em-
pirical truth remained common. With appropriate 
defi nition, examples, instructions, and/or feedback, 
most were reasonably consistent in evaluating ar-
guments on the basis of validity. Thus most 12–13-
year-olds, unlike most 9–10-year-olds, apparently do 
have a suffi ciently explicit concept of logical form 
to differentiate validity of form from empirical truth, 
though many failed to spontaneously apply this com-
petence in Experiment 1. 
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Finally, almost all college students spontane-
ously distinguished arguments on the basis of valid-
ity and, after defi nition, examples, instructions, and/
or feedback, were consistent in doing so. This im-
pressive performance stands in sharp contrast to the 
well-documented diffi culties they have on a vari-
ety of complex logical reasoning tasks (e.g., Evans, 
1983). Although college students often have genuine 
diffi culty with abstract deductive reasoning, they do 
have a clear “sense of the game.” 
It is noteworthy that, whereas fourth graders 
showed little grasp of validity in any of the present 
experiments, and college students showed excellent 
performance in all of them, seventh graders did sub-
stantially better in Experiments 2 and 3, involving 
defi nition, examples, instructions, and/or feedback, 
than in Experiment 1, involving spontaneous appli-
cation of the concept. Seventh-grade performance 
was about midway between fourth-grade and college 
performance in Experiment 1 but was statistically in-
distinguishable from college performance in Experi-
ments 2 and 3. These fi ndings suggest that, whereas 
application of the concept of validity (performance) 
increases over a wide age range (Experiment l), the 
underlying competence develops fairly suddenly be-
tween ages 10 and 12 (Experiments 2 and 3). 
Development of the concept of validity can 
thus be divided into two phases (cf. Moshman, 1977; 
Overton & Newman, 1982). The fi rst phase involves 
a relatively sudden emergence of the concept be-
tween ages 10 and 12. This is followed by increas-
ing ability to use the concept under conditions that 
are not ideal in eliciting it and/or in facilitating its 
successful application (e.g., Experiment 1). The ev-
idence for relatively sudden development of com-
petence in this area is consistent with Fischer and 
Pipp’s (1984) suggestion that cognitive development 
in general is marked by relatively sudden changes in 
“optimal level,” that is, in performance under opti-
mal conditions. The specifi c ages correspond to what 
Fischer and Pipp predict for the elementary level of 
abstract competence. The present data directly ad-
dress what has long been one of the central issues 
in the study of the development of logical reasoning: 
Do children’s logical abilities undergo qualitative 
change? It appears to us that the clearest evidence 
for such change comes not from studies of fi rst-order 
inferential abilities (how people reach conclusions 
from premises) but rather from studies of metalogic 
(how people construe the nature of logic) (e.g., Be-
reiter et al., 1979; Osherson & Markman, 1975; Pie-
raut-Le Bonniec, 1980; Somerville et al., 1979; see 
also Braine & Rumain, 1983). Moshman and Tim-
mons (1982) proposed that, in addition to the rela-
tively early changes related to the concept of logical 
necessity that have already been documented in the 
literature, there is a second and later qualitative shift 
consisting of comprehension of the concept of infer-
ential validity and its differentiation from empirical 
truth. The results of the present research support that 
hypothesis. 
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